live from israel

live from israel skip to main | skip to sidebar live from israel israel is here!!!   loading...   tuesday, june 19, 2007 happy birthday israel posted by luckyluck at 12:54 am 0 comments     labels: 59th, birthday, happy, independence, israel tuesday, june 05, 2007 what if israel had turned back? op-ed contributor sharediggfacebooknewsvinepermalink by tom segev published: june 5, 2007 jerusalem skip to next paragraph david suter forty years ago today, on the morning of june 5, 1967, jordan launched an artillery attack on the israeli part of jerusalem. in reaction israel conquered the arab sections of the city as well as the west bank. history is full of “what ifs,” and responsible historians should not indulge in such speculation. but journalists may. what if israel hadn’t taken east jerusalem and the west bank in the six-day war? would the palestinian situation have found some solution and israel be living at least in relative peace with its neighbors? would islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have been avoided?perhaps. but the alternate history is not as outrageous or inconceivable as one might think. leading israeli policy planners had determined six months before the six-day war that capturing the west bank would be bad for the country. recently declassified israeli government documents show that according to these policy planners, taking over the west bank would weaken the relative strength of israel’s jewish majority, encourage palestinian nationalism and ultimately lead to violent resistance.these comprehensive political and strategic discussions began in november 1966 and concluded in january 1967. the participants were representatives of the mossad, the israel defense forces’ intelligence branch and the foreign ministry. the documents they prepared were approved by prime minister levi eshkol and the army’s chief of staff, yitzhak rabin, and therefore reflect israel’s strategic thinking six months before the war. there was general agreement that it would be to israel’s advantage for king hussein of jordan, whose country controlled the west bank, to remain in power: he had, in effect, accepted israel’s existence, so israel naturally had an interest in strengthening his regime. hussein was also endeavoring to unify the west bank with the east bank and was encouraging west bank palestinians to migrate to the east. over the preceding 15 years, the number of palestinians who had left the west bank for the east had reached 200,000. moreover, approximately 100,000 palestinians had left jordan altogether. hussein’s effort to integrate palestinians was “a positive phenomenon from israel’s point of view,” concluded the final position paper that emerged from that winter’s discussions. hussein was acting to eradicate the palestinian question, and this was an excellent reason not to take the west bank away from him.but when jordan attacked the israeli part of jerusalem on the first day of the conflict, all reason was forgotten. jordan’s attack obviously called for some kind of retaliation — but striking back at the jordanian army did not require the conquest of the west bank or east jerusalem. records of the israeli cabinet meeting where the scope of the retaliation was determined are now available. amazingly they show that not one of the cabinet ministers ever asked why it was in the interest of israel to control the arab parts of jerusalem. israel was about to take over some of the holiest places in the christian and the muslim world, but no analysts were called in to offer the cabinet alternative ideas. no experts on international law were asked to brief the ministers on the legal implications of their pending decision. the ministers obviously felt there was no need to raise these questions: the answer was as clear as only fantasy can be. acting under the influence of the age-old dream of return to zion as well as israel’s spectacular victory over egypt’s forces a few hours previously, the ministers decided with their hearts, not their heads, to take east jerusalem. their emotions propelled the israelis to act against their national interest. it may have been a series of threatening moves taken by egypt, or it may have been the intoxication of victory, but in view of the results of the war there was indeed no justification for the panic that had preceded it, nor for the euphoria that took hold after it, which is what makes the story of israel in 1967 so difficult to comprehend. and of course once taken, east jerusalem could not be given back. to the present day it remains the major obstacle for a settlement. i belong to a generation of israelis who slowly but surely came to believe in peace. we needed to believe in it. the years since the 1967 conflict led us from war to war, and from one mistake to another. when new hopes emerged, they were overcome by disappointments, and then forgotten. still, we regarded the conquests of 1967 as temporary and were encouraged by the 1979 peace agreement between israel and egypt, under which israel withdrew from egyptian territory captured in 1967. we believed that peace with the palestinians would follow.but peace with the palestinians has not come one inch closer. as a result more and more israelis realize today that israel gained absolutely nothing from the conquest of the palestinian territories. speculating again in hindsight — israel may have been better off giving up the west bank and east jerusalem without peace than signing the 1994 peace agreement with jordan while keeping these territories. forty years of oppression and palestinian terrorism, both extremely cruel, have undermined israel’s jewish and democratic foundations. with about 400,000 israelis living in east jerusalem and the west bank and with extreme islamism as a driving force among the palestinians, the conflict has become infinitely more difficult to solve. hence young israelis have good reason to look at my generation and say, “you blew it.” i suppose we did. in contrast to my generation, these young people no longer presume to know what should be done to solve the conflict; indeed they often no longer believe in peace. many resort to cynical skepticism and fatalistic pessimism. and yet — less idealistic and more pragmatic than people of my generation — young israelis may also be more realistic than us. their immediate challenge is conflict management, rather than futile efforts to formulate grand schemes of ultimate solutions to the conflict. with fewer hopes and lower expectations they just may be able to make life at least somewhat more livable for both israelis and palestinians. given the present circumstances, that would be no small accomplishment.tom segev, a columnist for the israeli newspaper haaretz, is the author, most recently, of “1967: israel, the war and the year that transformed the middle east.” posted by luckyluck at 7:26 am 0 comments     labels: 1967, historian, israel, middle east, six day war, tom segev saturday, april 07, 2007 the second coming of yeshayahu leibowitz avi steinberg once upon a time, the prospect of yeshayahu leibowitz’s ideas going mainstream and driving government policy probably seemed as likely as the improbable scenario of leftists demonstrating in support of ariel sharon. but israel is a land of strange occurrences. and so, if the mass pro-sharon left-wing demonstration that in fact happened last spring in tel aviv didn’t presage the coming of the end of days itself, it might well have signified an equally unexpected moment in israeli politics: the arrival of the leibowitzian age. during his life, leibowitz’s status in israeli culture was that of both hero and pariah. a renowned scientist—he was head of the biological chemistry department at hebrew university—leibowitz also made a name for himself as an idiosyncratic social critic and religious thinker. he was an orthodox jew who said that the state of israel must have no religious significance. he decried the nationalist claims of the right and the peacenik dreams of the left. and, hardly an aloof intellectual, he was a well-known personality who lectured to any and every audience and entered into warm correspondences with anyone who wrote to him; he even had his own radio show. as israel’s gadfly, his comments—especially his more outrageous remarks—often made headlines. many in israel know him as the man who referred to israeli soldiers serving in the territories as “judeo-nazis,” for comparing idf undercover units to hamas, and for his open call for soldiers to refuse to serve in the idf. leibowitz's status in israeli culture was exemplified by a controversy that surrounded him in 1993. after he was announced as the winner of the prestigious israel prize, a wave of protest rose. critics complained loudly: how could israel award the highest prize in the land, they said, to a man who heaped vile epithets on israel’s soldiers and leadership, who actively undermined the work of the security forces? the issue escalated until prime minister yitzhak rabin’s cabinet voted 15-1 to censure education minister shulamit aloni for her decision to give him the award. rabin himself threatened to boycott the award ceremony, prompting leibowitz to relinquish the prize altogether. it is a tragic irony that rabin and his cabinet refused to listen to leibowitz at that moment. there was no greater critic of the religious-based ideology that was used to justify the assassination of rabin than yeshayahu leibowitz. but it is also ironic that leibowitz's ideas have now been taken up by a likud government, justifying the recent "disengagement" from the gaza strip and part of the west bank. "disengagement" (hebrew, hitnatkut) is a deliberate neologism, coined by sharon's pr team. in theory, it implies a separation not just of israeli territory from the palestinian territories, but also of israelis from palestinians: it is an attempt to geographically but also culturally, politically, and economically disentangle the fate of israel from palestine. in practice, it admits of multiple interpretations. many people, both in israel and outside the country, believe (and perhaps, hope) that there will be more territorial evacuations, that the disengagement was more than a one-time political maneuver—and that it indeed constitutes a new policy approach, a new process. in this reading, the decline and fall of the left's old process, the peace process—an approach based on the principle of “land for peace”—and the recognition that the right's vision of “the unpartitioned land of israel” is unsustainable has led sharon’s government to withdraw its own traditional ideological alliances and rethink it strategic assumptions. on the other hand, perhaps "disengagement" was just a ploy. in fact, while the name may be new, the path israel has taken—unilateral withdrawal combined with the uprooting of jewish settlements—is not new to israeli thought. from the moment the territories fell under israel control in 1967 until his death in the mid 1990s yeshayahu leibowitz insisted that it was the only way israel would survive as a jewish and democratic state. and some people were listening closely. one of those people was yonatan bassi, the man ariel sharon appointed to head the disengagement administration. in a pre-evacuation interview with haaretz, bassi made the leibowitz-disengagement connection in clear terms. “the occupation,” he said , “was only an instrument. it released from within us the flight from freedom, the flight from rationalism. i am not against messianism. but i am against totalistic messianism. because totalistic messianism can be lethal. it is liable to bring about a situation in which we will lose this country.” when the interviewer responded that this position made bassi sound like a student of leibowitz, bassi readily accepted the label. “there is not a line of leibowitz’s writings that i have not read,” he replied. “he influenced me very deeply.” but bassi, an already notorious figure among pro-settlement circles, was also savvy enough to distance himself from leibowitz, who is even more notorious in those circles. ever the moderate, bassi added this caveat: “but leibowitz was an extreme person. he was too attracted to the edge, whereas i am looking for the middle. and i am trying to say to my friends: do not go to the edge. return to the middle. return to the balance that we lost immediately after the six-day war.” the upshot of bassi’s comments is that israel needs leibowitz’s ideas without leibowitz, the curmudgeon and provocateur. or, in other words, leibowitz’s ideas are too important to remain marginal on account of leibowitz’s divisive rhetoric. indeed bassi’s role as the head of the disengagement heralds just that: the (attempted) mainstreaming of leibowitz’s views and the translation of these views into actual government policy it is fitting that the leibowitz’s moment in the mainstream comes during a period of potentially radical political realignment in israel. sharon’s redirection of likud has rendered old distinctions of “right” and “left” hazy at best, and possibly obsolete. a common agenda—at least for the moment—has emerged under the rubric of the “israeli center,” which, in reality, is a patchwork of moderate left and right wingers. in a variety of ways, leibowitz’s political views match the idiosyncrasies of israel’s new center. on the one hand, leibowitz was unambiguous in his contempt for the territorial ambitions of the right-wing. on the other, he rejected the leftist notion of “land for peace.” this odd position matches the thinking of sharon’s coalition, which has rejected the approach of “land for peace”—hence withdrawal—but which also operates under the assumption that a credible peace agreement is not on the table now or at any point in the near future—hence the unilateral aspect. the issue of the territories, leibowitz wrote on the heels of israel’s victory in 1967, had nothing to do with land and everything to do with the population that lives in the land. that year, when leaders of both the right and left hailed israel’s new territorial gains, leibowitz warned of the ruinous nature of occupation and of the looming threat of a demographic collapse. in a 1968 essay, “the territories,” leibowitz wrote that sovereignty over the arab populations of both the territories and israel would “effect the liquidation of the state of israel as the state of the jewish people and bring about a catastrophe for the jewish people as a whole; it will undermine the social structure that we have created in the state and cause the corruption of individuals, both jew and arab.” he predicated the disintegration of the jewish labor force, the dangerous disillusionment of the arab israeli sector, the pervasive culture of corruption and the intifadas. but leibowitz, who was an orthodox jew, saved his harshest critique for the religious-based territorialist arguments. in that same essay from 1968, he wrote: “counterfeit religion identifies national interests with the service of god and imputes to the state—which is only an instrument serving human needs—supreme value from a religious standpoint. the ‘halakhic’ reasons for remaining in control of the territories are ridiculous, since the state of israel does not acknowledge the authority of the torah and the majority of its inhabitants reject the imperative demands of the mitzvoth.” in other words, religious nationalism is a paradox: while nationalism serves the material needs of the collective the jewish religion, according to leibowitz, places the collective in the service of god. (leibowitz insisted that self-serving motives have no place in religion even, for example, the 'spiritual' desire to worship.) to leibowitz, the territorial messianism of the israeli religious right distorts the true nature of jewish messianism; he associates authentic messianism entirely with pure religious actions—following the mitzvot—not secular achievements in war and politics. characteristically, leibowitz went even further, stating that the religious-nationalist veneration of the land was a literal form of idolatry, a sanctification of nationalism that would have cataclysmic results. “not every ‘return to zion’ is a religiously significant achievement,” he wrote. “another sort of return is described in the words of the prophet: ‘when you entered you defiled my land and made my heritage an abomination” (jeremiah 2:7).” in other words, at the height of israeli triumphalism, at precisely the moment when religious messianic fervor was at a fever pitch, leibowitz was comparing it to abomination. leibowitz’s withering critique of the right and especially of the religious right would seem to place him in the camp of the left. indeed he was often mistaken as a leftist. but he had plenty of criticism for the left as well. throughout his life, leibowitz remained deeply skeptical of the possibility of reconciliation between israelis and arabs. in an 1976 essay entitled “occupation and terror,” leibowitz rejected the “land for peace” approach, calling it a “slogan that means holding on to the territories indefinitely.” why? because "dialogue with the palestinians is not likely to take place on the sole basis of the explicit intention to return the territories after reaching an agreement. honest dialogue is not possible between rulers and ruled: it is possible only between equals.” leibowitz sided neither with right nor left. on the one hand, he concluded that “a program of ‘peace (or agreement) in return for territories’ does not seem feasible. evacuation of the territories necessarily precedes any serious effort toward peace." (emphasis added) yet on the other hand, he said, "this is stated without illusions: while evacuation of the territories is a necessary condition for peace (or an agreement under pressure of the superpowers), it is not certain that that it is also a sufficient condition….there is no guarantee that evacuation will bring us real peace, or even an agreement granting reasonable security.” although he never ruled out the possibility for reconciliation in the distant future—or under the pressure of the world powers—leibowitz thought that peace was a very remote scenario. he believed that the concept of “land for peace” was flawed and untenable. full and immediate withdrawal was an absolute necessity. ideally, though wildly improbably, withdrawal might create the conditions necessary for a future peace. at the very least, though, it would allow israel to retain the integrity of its democracy and spare israeli society the ruinous ramifications of occupation. according to leibowitz, israel’s security will come neither from the vision of wide borders—and is, in fact, weakened by the population that lives within these borders—nor will it come from half-baked “peace” schemes. he was, in effect, a leftist on territorial issues (with no patience for religious arguments) and a rightist on peace prospects. this bubbling brew of ideas is, in short, what characterizes the new israeli center; it describes the fragile coalition that made the disengagement possible. and it’s likely that only someone as politically credible and shrewd as sharon could have pulled it off. he was, after all, shrewd enough to appoint a leibowitzian as his deputy. nevertheless, the radical nature of leibowitz’s thought cannot be denied; leibowitz was not a compromiser. he believed that only a full, immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the territories would save israel. bassi, reflecting current right wing realpolitik, does not believe that a full withdrawal from the west bank is feasible—neither politically nor logistically. bassi’s position, thus, reflects as type of leibowitz-lite perspective, a domesticated version of leibowitz’s solution. bassi might argue that he is implementing leibowitz to the extent that this is possible in the israel of 2005. leibowitz might reply that this sense of helplessness in the face of pro-settler politics is (yet another) strong indicator that a full and immediate withdrawal is crucial and long-overdue. thus, from a true leibowitzian point of view, the disengagement might turn out to be yet another dangerous delusion. perhaps, like the prophets he liked to quote to support his views, leibowitz is a character doomed to be perpetually misquoted and misapplied. like all radicals, leibowitz’s edginess was essential to his thought—implementing his views, therefore, would necessarily require adopting his harsh and uncompromising attitude. needless to say, this is far from politic, for it takes a unique type of person—and an even more unique country—to burn with moderation, to be zealous in the name of subtle, middle-of-the-road positions. until that leibowitzian golden republic of fanatically moderate rule take holds, the battle of the under-zealous moderates and the over-zealous extremists continues. in the meantime, many in israel are staking their hopes on leibowitz-lite. avi steinberg is a freelance writer based in boston. last summer he was in israel and gaza covering the disengagement for the plain dealer sunday magazine (cleveland, ohio) and the jewish telegraphic agency. posted by luckyluck at 10:25 am 0 comments     labels: arabs, avi steinberg, disengagement, gaza, gush emunim, israel, leibowitz, middle east, peace, philosophy, religious zionism, revisionist zionism, settlers, sharon, yeshajahu, zionism saturday, january 20, 2007 a brief history of the missed opportunity by amnon barzilai a week after the end of the six-day war, which broke out 35 years ago, on june 5, 1967, prime minister levi eshkol met with maki (israel communist party) mk moshe sneh in eshkol's knesset offices. even though sneh had disassociated himself from the zionist political establishment by joining maki, the two were old friends going back to the 1940s, when sneh was head of the hagannah's national headquarters.sneh pleaded with eshkol to declare immediately israel's recognition of self-determination for the arab palestinian nation and recognition of its right to a state of its own alongside israel. he spoke of an opportunity that would not return, to build a bridge to the people whom the arab states had betrayed over and over again."i think there's a lot of political wisdom in what you're saying," eshkol said, but then explained his political constraints. "if it was a different government, such initiatives might be possible. but i think it's impossible. if i reach out a hand, and no hand is returned in peace, then abu jilda and the terrorist will give me a petzele (slap) that will knock me off my chair. and who'll replace me? you already know."sneh knew the codes. "abu jilda" was eshkol's nickname for defense minister moshe dayan. "the terrorist" was what he called the former head of the etzel, menachem begin, head of the herut party and a minister without portfolio.on the eve of the war, at the height of the three-week anxiety-ridden waiting period, the herut-liberal (gahal) bloc, led by begin, joined forces with rafi, led by david ben-gurion, moshe dayan, and shimon peres, to strip eshkol of the defense portfolio and give it to dayan. the alliance between the age-old opponents, begin and ben-gurion, was the result of eshkol's hesitation. despite the massed egyptian forces in the sinai and the closing of the straits of tiran, the government was unable to decide whether to go to war.four days before the war, a beaten eshkol gave in to the public and political pressure on him and named dayan defense minister. after the war, he could only sadly watch as dayan won all the credit for the victory.on the fifth day of the war, after the west bank was already conquered, the paratroopers had already cried at the western wall, and the israel defense forces were parked on the banks of the suez canal and jordan river, the daily daf, a newspaper published by olam hazeh and edited by then-mk uri avnery, came out in tel aviv with the first public call in israel for the government to establish a palestinian state in the west bank and gaza.avnery proposed conducting a referendum among the residents of the territories, to answer "yes," or "no" to the question if they wanted a palestinian state that would be aligned with israel.eshkol, unlike most of the other members of the mapai leadership, had never boycotted the editor of the controversial newspaper and magazine. avnery, like sneh, was a welcome guest in eshkol's office. he, too, had gone to eshkol to present the outlines of a plan. but eshkol's response to avnery was less candid than the one to sneh. he smiled at avnery and in a somewhat apologetic tone, said, "uri, what kind of a businessman are you? when you negotiate you demand the maximum, propose the minimum and end up in the middle." avnery didn't let that pass. "mr. prime minister," he said, "that may be true when you're selling a horse, but not if you want to end an historic conflict between two peoples."golda says the sheheyanubut the calls for recognition of the palestinians as a people and to grant them self-determination and a state of their own, and warnings against the dangers of occupation and annexation, were few and far between. israel after the six-day war was caught up in a whirlwind of ecstasy, with a sense of unlimited, euphoric power. the main question was whether the territories were a bargaining card or if they were liberated, new, held or occupied. giving them up unilaterally was not part of the debate.on june 13, dayan gave a patronizing radio interview to the bbc, saying , "we're waiting or a phone call from the arabs ... if the arabs want a change, they can get in touch.""the most common term heard after the victory was `we were like dreamers' - from psalms," writes michael keren in his book "the pen and the sword," about the response of israel's intellectuals to the results of the war. "the use of biblical phrases seemed more appropriate than day-to-day language to describe the new reality." on june 7, dayan said at the western wall, "we have returned to the most sacred of all our places, we have returned never to leave again."the sense of sanctity and secular intertwining was evident in the political institutions of the ruling party. a rafi secretariat session on june 8 was surprised to hear ben-gurion, who opposed the war, say "we now control jerusalem and that is one of the greatest of events - one of the first things that must be done is build neighborhoods - to immediately settle the jewish quarter. if there are empty arab houses, we'll put jews in them. the same is true for hebron - i am sure that with the current mood, the people will go." mapai's secretariat, which met the same day, opened with the secretary-general of the party, golda meir, reciting the sheheyanu: "blessed are you o lord our god, ruler of the universe, who has enabled us to see this joyous day."a few days after the war, two of the brightest young stars in the mapam establishment, author moshe shamir and ephraim reiner, met. they spent their formative years together in the hashomer hatzair's kibbutz mishmar haemek. shamir was the chief counselor, teaching marx. mapam's ideological platform called for a bi-national state. now, shamir told reiner, "the world has revolved, we've liberated the land of israel, it's ours now." reiner listened in astonishment. when he went home, he reported, "moshe shamir has lost his mind."shamir wasn't alone. poet natan alterman and writer haim guri were among those labor stalwarts who joined the movement for the greater land of israel.a few days after the end of the war, an evening devoted to the victory in jerusalem was held at tel aviv's tzavta. shamir spoke excitedly about the conquest of the city. actor yossi yadin read poems by haim hefer. "and then dahn ben-amotz got up," writes amnon dankner in his biography of ben-amotz, "and said `i detest the orgy of tears and weeping at the western wall.' all hell broke out in the audience, people booed him off the stage."professor yeshayahu leibowitz, editor in chief of the encyclopedia judaica, joined in the debate. in an interview with ha'aretz at the end of june, leibowitz responded to a question from silvi keshet about the events at the wall, referring to how rabbi shlomo goren had been carried on the shoulders of a crowd and had blown a shofar. "it seems that even at the most dramatic moment in the history of the jewish people, that clown had to blow a shofar and conduct the most foul and tasteless performance." leibowitz was the first to warn about the dangers of the occupation. "if we swallow even a small amount of what we have conquered, we will become far weaker. another million arabs will undermine all the foundations of our existence."on august 22, an article appeared in the ruling party's newspaper, davar, under the headline "land of the forefathers." "even those conquerors who went furthest in their means of oppression, far beyond what moshe dayan is willing or capable of doing, sat on thorns and scorpions until they were uprooted, not to mention the total moral destruction that extended occupation does to the occupier. even unavoidable occupation is a corrupting occupation." thus the phrase "the occupation corrupts" entered the political lexicon. the article was written by a 27-year-old from kibbutz hulda named amos oz.rabin didn't respondthe idea of a palestinian state, surprisingly, did win a certain measure of popularity right after the war, even in the top echelon of the army. according to avnery, one of the idea's proponents was armored corps general yisrael tal, with whom avnery says he held a series of conversations about the concept. another general who was intrigued by the idea was supplies chief mati peled.the assumption was that like after 1956, the superpowers would force israel to return the territories. that raised the question to whom? there were those who argued it would be better not to return the land to jordan, but instead establish a palestinian state as a non-militarized buffer between israel and jordan, that would block the way of an arab invasion from the east.on june 10, after the idf took the golan heights, military intelligence's research department, headed by shlomo gazit - who would later become commander of military intelligence - prepared a six-point plan for political action. the plan said israel has no interest in occupying the territories at the expense of the arabs, but some border corrections have to be made. israel supports the creation of an independent palestinian state in the west bank and gaza. the palestinian state will not be allowed to form an army. the old city of jerusalem will become an open city, with a status quo like the vatican's. the proposal was sent to dayan, to chief of staff yitzhak rabin, his deputy, haim bar-lev, and to military intelligence commander aharon yariv. "unfortunately," gazit later wrote in his book "trap of fools," "not one of them responded to the document. there was no discussion and no practical steps were taken toward the path we laid out."the day after jerusalem was taken, two officers from the military government met with attorney aziz shehade. the meeting took place in ramallah. shehade had represented the palestinian refugees at the lausanne conference in 1949. the two israelis were david kimche, then a shin bet officer and later deputy head of the mossad, and accountant dan bavli, who also had ties inside the israeli defense establishment. over fine coffee they listened in amazement as shehade explained his plan for a palestinian state in the territories.on sunday, june 12, the two officers presented shehade's plan to former chief of staff zvi zur. a few days later, zur accepted an appointment by dayan to be his assistant. from him, zur went to rehavam ze'evi, then assistant head of military operations. ze'evi, bavli writes in his book "missed dreams and opportunities," which came out a few months ago, supported the idea of an autonomous palestinian entity, and proposed that a state be established in the samaria area. ze'evi suggested the name ishmael for the state.the 68th battalion of the jerusalem brigade was in the dahariya area near hebron during the war and for a month after. a company sergeant in one of the regiments, gadi yatziv, then a ph.d candidate in sociology at the hebrew university, asked to make some use of his time. with his commander's permission he got a jeep and a translator and started making regular visits to the refugee camp at deheishe near bethlehem and aruv, near hebron. he summed up his impressions after he finished his reserves in a document he called conversations with refugees. the conclusion: a window of opportunity had opened in which it would be possible to satisfy the national ambitions of the palestinians. there's no alternative, he wrote, but to give them sovereignty over half the country.a few months later, yatziv was one of the founders of the peace and security group, which named prof. yehoshua arielli as its leader. the group proposed withdrawing to the international borders in exchange for peace. on june 20, ha'aretz published a plan by prof. yohanan peres for the establishment of a palestinian state in the center of the country and gaza. "we the jews," he wrote, "understand perhaps better than others the attraction of political independence, even on a small bit of land."on june 28, ha'aretz ran a petition signed by a long list of intellectuals who called for solving the refugee problem. the petition said, "this is the first time since the war of independence that we can approach a solution to the problem. to bring the refugees into the normal course of life and take their affairs out of the hands of those who used them for political purposes."those calling for a palestinian state and a solution to the refugee problem were not only few, but highly individualist. though most came from the elite, they had no real influence on policy-makers. they stood out in their eccentricity in the landscape of the time, and many were in disputes with each other. there was no way for a common platform to be formed by the likes of avnery, leibowitz and arielli.`enlightened occupation'in the first two weeks after the war, a moderate spirit still emanated from the prime minister's office. on june 14, eshkol visited troops in sinai. during the conversations with the soldiers he said, "our hold on sinai will last until the necessary permanent arrangements are made - until the practical arrangements that will prevent threats on israel's security in the future." on june 19, the government of israel, including the gahal ministers, agreed in principle to peace with syria and egypt on the basis of a withdrawal to the international boundaries. but the decision remained on paper. reality was stronger.beneath the surface, a dispute broke out between eshkol and dayan over who would take charge of the arabs of the territories. on the same day the government decided in secret on readiness for a withdrawal, eshkol told dayan that the prime minister's office would take responsibility for managing policy in the areas under military administration. but eshkol didn't have the strength to do so. dayan later wrote in his autobiography, "neither the prime minister nor the finance minister dealt with, nor were able to deal with, these matters - reality took its course. i was personally interested and dedicated and the fact that the administration of the administered territories was in the hands of the military government concentrated the handling of the arabs of the territories in my hands."dayan's victory became a personal victory in the public and political world after the war. within two months he formulated the open bridges policy between the west bank and jordan, and eliminated the need for the arabs of the west bank and gaza to need passes to go to israel. the "enlightened occupation" had begun.on july 27, yigal allon brought his plan to the government. later he would say that the plan was meant "to determine the borders of the state of israel so they guarantee a strategically complete state - and a demographically jewish state, without dispossessing the arabs, and while settling jews." allon proposed annexing the gaza strip and the golan heights, settling the jordan valley and establishing a small palestinian state in the heart of the west bank, as "sovereign territory linked to israel in a mutual defense treaty, a common market, and cultural agreements."on july 15, kibbutz merom golan went up on the golan heights. within a year, 14 settlements would be placed in the territories, nine of them on the golan. others dotted the northern sinai, northern dead sea, jordan valley and gush etzion.dayan and allon were meanwhile at war over who would take over the labor party and the prime minister's office. a major factor contributing to the hardening of the israeli position was the september 2, 1967 khartoum conference of the arab league, which declared no recognition of israel, no negotiations with israel, and no peace with israel.and on pesach, 1968, at the park hotel in hebron, a group of people backed by allon, and led by moshe levinger, calling themselves gush emunim (bloc of the faithful), announced they would not be leaving the hotel after the seder. the settlement movement as we know it today was born.outside the hotel, profesor arielli and his associates, including professors yaacov katz, yaacov talmon, and dan patenkin, held up placards denouncing the settlement. "no to annexation, yes to peace and security," the posters said. they regarded the hebron settlers - for whom allon would later build kiryat arba - as the first signs of an outbreak of messianic hysteria. and thus began the left's running battle against the policy of annexation. posted by luckyluck at 6:39 am 0 comments     labels: arabs, ben gurion, eshkol, israel, leibowitz, middle east, missed oportunity, peace, six day war, zionism friday, january 05, 2007 stand up - speak up posted by luckyluck at 3:24 pm 0 comments     labels: campaign, no racism, poster saturday, december 16, 2006 hezbollah confession this's iran/syria war by proxy-how sadhezbollah fighter admitting to taking part in a raid on israel and undergoing training in iran.he was tasked with cutting certain access routes during the cross-border raid july 12 in which hezbollah captured two israeli troops and another eight died in clashes.he had undergone several training sessions and courses since joining the militant group as a teenager.in '03 he was driven from beirut to damascus in hezbollah cars and then took a special flight to iran, where he took part in military exercises in along with 40 or 50 other hezbollah members, he said. he crossed borders without passing through passport control.he said he had attended an 18-month night school course for soldiers, which included classes in islamic law and jurisprudence. ... (more) posted by luckyluck at 1:34 pm 0 comments     labels: arabs, israel, middle east the cult of the suicide bomberfootage of suicide bombing attempt. new dvd explores the history and mystery of suicide bombing. their devastating and deadly actions punctuate the world news almost nightly, yet they remain faceless figures amidst the violence and turmoil that engulf the middle east. and, whether it's the c4-laden martyrs of hezbollah or the car bombing insurgents of iraq, what could possibly compel a suicide bomber to voluntarily take their own lives, along with those of hundreds of innocent victims? there is perhaps no one better equipped to investigate this terrifying practice than robert baer, a decorated, former middle east cia agent and the man george clooney's character was based on in the academy award®-winning film, syriana.in the groundbreaking and acclaimed documentary, the cult of the suicide bomber, baer returns to his former center of operations to trace the origins of the modern day bomber from the iran-iraq war to the middle eastern streets of today.the cult of the suicide bomber reveals the secret history of the suicide bomber, from the child martyrs of the iran-iraq war, the truck bombers in southern lebanon, to the young men and women who now strap explosives to their bodies and calmly blow themselves up in crowded streets and markets across the middle east.baer also reveals the fascinating story of the world's first suicide bomber, 13-year-old hossein fahmideh -- who was martyred in the iran-iraq war and is now a hero in iran. posted by luckyluck at 1:27 pm 0 comments     labels: arabs, israel, middle east monday, november 27, 2006 hizbullah lebanon - guns in the closet lebanon (every house)kevin sites in south lebanon villages.he talks with the hizbullah member and he says there s weapons in every house in the neighborhood posted by luckyluck at 2:02 pm 0 comments     labels: arabs, israel, middle east sunday, november 26, 2006 christian lebanese glorifying zionist armychristian lebanese glorifying zionist army in lebanons civil war 1982 onwards when israel invaded posted by luckyluck at 11:27 am 0 comments     labels: arabs, israel, middle east loyalty to one's country - resistance jihadan explanitory vid about "resistance jihad" and loyalty issues in the muslim society. posted by luckyluck at 10:51 am 0 comments     older posts subscribe to: posts (atom) contributors luckyluck ofek   blog archive ▼ 2007 (5) ▼ june (2) happy birthday israel what if israel had turned back? ► april (1) the second coming of yeshayahu leibowitz ► january (2) a brief history of the missed opportunity stand up - speak up ► 2006 (23) ► december (2) hezbollah confession this's iran/syria war by prox... the cult of the suicide bomber footage of suicide ... ► november (4) hizbullah lebanon - guns in the closet lebanon (ev... christian lebanese glorifying zionist army christi... loyalty to one's country - resistance jihad an exp... david grossman's speech at the rabin memorial ► october (1) after the war is before the war. ► september (1) the year israel returned to lebanon ► august (5) liel kolet english first aid for the people in she... video to remember the fallen israeli soldiers today's soldiers don't want to be heroes, they wan... not the way to go to war israel lebanese conflict - a reaction ► july (1) bush gives qualified support for israel’s strikes ► june (1) pallywood: german expose of palestinian media hi-j... ► february (7) give peace a chance voices from israel about iran and the life in isra... rinat memri founder and president memri manager speaks on iran yigal at ginsburg who is really oppressing the palestinians? ► january (1) the ap's "martyrs ► 2005 (5) ► december (1) muslim grinches steal bethlehem christmas ► november (1) israel ► march (3) gallery gk3  gk1        labels israel (21) middle east (20) arabs (19) leibowitz (2) peace (2) six day war (2) zionism (2) 1967 (1) 59th (1) avi steinberg (1) ben gurion (1) birthday (1) campaign (1) disengagement (1) eshkol (1) gaza (1) gush emunim (1) happy (1) historian (1) independence (1) missed oportunity (1) no racism (1) philosophy (1) poster (1) religious zionism (1) revisionist zionism (1) settlers (1) sharon (1) tom segev (1) yeshajahu (1)   get jaxtr | login   job profile    

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